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U.S. History and Beyond

N

Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann

early all readers who have persisted to this point in
our roundtable discussion understand the depth of
commitment required to write serious book-length
history and recognize that most of us are nonetheless likely
to reach very small audiences. Such disjuncture between
effort and result suggests something about historians—
doggedness, perhaps, or other less positive qualities that
many of those with whom we live might offer up in an
honest moment (mulishness, obsessiveness, irrelevance).
Indeed, we seem to be almost the last scholarly discipline
that writes mostly books. But this disjuncture also helps
explain the scale of my gratitude for receiving such careful
readings and critiques of my book from four serious
scholars whose work I admire. I thank them each for their
time, their generosity, and their insights.
The reviewers use phrases such as “does an
extraordinary service” (Christopher Jespersen), “does offer
a broad, and quite satisfying, interpretive framework”
(Rebecca de Schweinitz), “has made a significant
contribution” using “an enormous number of sources”
(Scott Kaufman), and offers “an ambitious project . . . that
he substantially achieves” (Daniel Sargent). I am tempted
to fold my cards, collect my earnings, tip my hat, and head
for home. No such luck, reader: the reviewers, as expected,
also offer criticisms and suggestions, and these deserve to
be engaged. So let me sharpen up my knives and see if I
can carve into this particular feast of history and ideas in a
useful manner.
Writing a book encompassing both the history of the
United States and the history of the world across a decade
practically guarantees that attentive readers will find
information missing or interpretations shaded in ways they
dislike. The canvas is simply too large for unanimity. Editor
Andy Johns deserves credit for assembling a roundtable
of historians with such a diversity of research interests.
Christopher Jespersen and Rebecca de Schweinitz seem
primarily concerned about issues on the domestic side of
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the story, while Scott Kaufman and Daniel Sargent lean
more to issues on the international and global side. It is
tempting to invoke the old adage that if one is making
people unhappy on every side of an issue, one must be
doing something right. This is not quite the case here,
but the range and diversity of the reviewers’ concerns do
highlight some of the challenges of trying to write history
on this scale.
Jespersen likes “the scope and ambition of the project”
but wants more analysis of the Tenerife air disaster in the
Azores, more discussion of professional basketball, and
more emphasis on Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon.
De Schweinitz wishes for more childhood history and
more social history of race reformers. Kaufman hopes for
more popular culture, including American television, and
more British history, including more Monty Python, but
less “Americentrism.” Sargent contemplates more Russian
and Indian history. The difficulty of writing this kind of
history persuasively for all readers should be crystal clear
by now. One is tempted, almost, to dive back into one’s own
small scholarly foxhole and settle back down into the safer
confines of knowing too much about too little. Instead, I am
taking careful notes for any future editions of The 1970s.
But I cannot resist a few brief annotations. First, Tenerife.
I mention the accident in one sentence in a long paragraph
of diverse examples of globalization’s unfinished business.
I might have used other examples of limits of the spread
of English as a global language, I suppose (perhaps the
sign in the Paris hotel elevator reading “Please leave your
values at the front desk”), rather than relying on David
Crystal’s Cambridge University Press book for this point.
Still, Tenerife hardly seems to qualify as a central target of
critique, particularly since clarity and standardization of
English language use were indeed one of the recommended
measures for air traffic controllers worldwide that resulted
specifically from the accident.
Second, professional basketball. It pains me to note
that it just was not that popular yet in the 1970s, nor that
important as an industry. For what it’s worth, I grew up
practically in the shadow of Duke University’s Cameron
Indoor Stadium, nearly obsessed with playing, watching,
and analyzing basketball. I went to ABA games in Raleigh’s
Dorton Arena with my father and talked courtside, starryeyed, with his former student, all-star guard Bob Verga.
Anyone who knew me in that decade could attest that
the relative lack of emphasis on basketball in The 1970s
demonstrates serious restraint in the face of temptation. I
will, however, be among the first to order a good book on
1970s basketball when it comes out.
Third, Ford’s pardon of Nixon: clearly important but
unwittingly omitted—point taken for the next edition.1
Fourth, previous literature? I admire Bruce Schulman’s
work on this decade, but I am no fan of David Frum’s
intemperate and tendentious book. As for the social
history of race reformers, my graduate school mentors—
all distinguished social historians of movements for racial
justice—would surely be cringing at the idea that I did not
provide enough on that topic, though my students would
not likely wish for a still-longer book to read. Those same
students, however, surely would have enjoyed still more
American television content, although All In The Family, I
must note, does actually make two appearances (115, 145).
More Monty Python: who could disagree? The next edition
will provide. But Americentrism, Russia, and India . . . now,
I believe, we are getting to the central challenge.
In simplest form, the goal of The 1970s was to explain
the development of American political culture during that
decade, particularly as expressed in popular ideas and
public policies, and place that development within a larger
global context. The values and ideas that shaped American
politics and culture were changing in crucial ways in this
decade, and similar changes were visible far beyond U.S.
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borders. To say that the book “suffers from Americentrism”
(Kaufman), then, is really to say that it does what it set out
to do. Guilty as charged. But Daniel Sargent will not let
me off so easily, and anyone reading his review will have
no trouble seeing why the Berkeley History Department
swept him up swiftly a few years back. He notes that “The
1970s bills itself as a ‘new global history,’ but the book in
fact operates at multiple levels” and that “American history
is the unambiguous priority among the national histories
that The 1970s engages.”
Here I must plead failure: failure to win a vigorous
debate with Princeton University Press, which insisted on
the use of “global history” in the title as a way to signal
the international scope of the book’s analysis. I preferred
other titles, particularly “More Equal, Less Equal: A New
History of the 1970s,” which telegraphed more directly,
I thought, the thrust of the book’s argument. The staff at
the press demurred, citing other titles on their list with
similar words and believing that such a title would be
more difficult to promote. This is not (really) a complaint
on my part: Princeton is an excellent press with which I am
quite happy, and its staff is superb. But a publisher is out to
sell books, appropriately enough, and in this case the title
wound up being reshaped by concerns about marketing. I,
however, ultimately signed off on the final title, so if it is
misleading that is finally, alas, my responsibility.
The core issue is methodological. What am I trying
to examine and explain, and how can I best do so? This
is a problem across our diverse field, a problem that is
reflected in its proliferating names: U.S. diplomatic history,
U.S. foreign relations history, U.S. international history,
transnational history, global history, the “U.S. and the
world,” and the “U.S. in the world.” The last is the most
awkward and seems increasingly the most commonly used.
Such awkwardness is not, to my mind, a negative indicator,
but rather an illustration of just how large and complicated
our field has become. There is not yet a brief, felicitous term
for the study of all the ways in which the most powerful
modern nation has interacted with the rest of the world.
My own intellectual commitments, from the beginning
of my career, have included the intimate connection of
U.S. domestic history to U.S. foreign relations—the inward
swing of the “U.S. in the world” barroom door—and have
increasingly come to include as well the connection between
U.S. history and world history—part of the outward swing
of that door.2 An emphasis on the place of the United States
in world history requires that we think comparatively about
the American past and how it shares with and differs from
the pasts of other nations, regions, and processes. Most
contemporary American political dialogue and far too
much U.S. historical writing reflexively assume a degree of
American exceptionalism or distinctiveness, regardless of
the politics of the speaker or writer. Historians in our field,
more than anyone else, must avoid that assumption until it
is demonstrated evidentially.
Sargent accords The 1970s credit for including “a
great deal of international history” as well as U.S. and
world history. At the same time, he suggests that, subtitle
notwithstanding, there is relatively less actual global
history in the book, and that developments at a global level,
such as economic integration or human rights activism,
might be granted somewhat greater causal agency than I
have allowed them in explaining events within the United
States and other nations in this decade.3 This is a persuasive
criticism, as the developing historiography increasingly
reveals.4
I am less persuaded by Sargent’s questioning of the
selection of cases in this decade. Certainly, focusing on the
Soviet Union, with some attention to India, would yield
different results than focusing on the United States, with
some attention to China, but then the very subject would be
different: Soviet/Russian history, rather than U.S. history,
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in international perspective. He raises the question of
whether “a global model is derived from a mainly American
experience, which is then held to cohere to the global
model,” and suggests that “different cases might have”
rendered “the American experience exceptional rather than
representative.” The weight of the evidence, particularly
in chapter 4, tilts sharply toward representation rather
than exceptionalism. Indeed, as Sargent then goes on to
suggest in his evenhanded fashion, the United States and
the other “advanced economies” might best be seen as a
vanguard for economic and political processes that would
eventually sweep through most of the rest of the world.
The Soviet story in this decade, as The 1970s does point
out, proved to be far more the temporary exception to the
larger pattern of increasing formal equality and shrinking
economic equality. But I grant that the amount of attention
paid in the book to developments in South Asia, like those
in the Soviet Union, is less than ideal—regardless of those
students who appreciate a less lengthy book. “Pattern,” for
what it’s worth, seems a more useful term in this analysis
than “model,” as the historical analysis in The 1970s shares
little of the social scientific predilection for theoretical
postulation.
Sargent raises one final issue: the problem of agency
and accountability for this decade’s turn away from public
sector expansion and toward “a new, rather harsher, kind
of political economy.” Was this momentous shift a result
of structural causes, along the lines of global economic
integration, or did it stem primarily from the actions of
individuals, “Leninists of the right”? As he suggests, how
we answer this question as the historiography of this
decade develops will reveal our sense of what else might
have been, including whether the old order might have
been extended “at least a few decades longer.” Chapter 5
does trace the major dissenters, whom I see ultimately as
gaining relatively meager political traction. While I have
little personal fondness for the results of this new political
economy, I do tend to see the structural causes, particularly
of technological and financial innovation, as powerfully
determinative—thus the slight note of resignation in the
book, as Sargent observes. But structures must be manned,
and real people devoted their lives to midwifing our
new, market-driven order. The ideologues, intellectuals,
politicians, media spokespersons, and organizational
activists who herded the United States and most of the
world into our current condition will face the judgment of
future generations for the peculiar combination of wealth
creation and maldistribution that they worked so hard to
create.
Notes:
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Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York, 2011); Samuel Moyn, The
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